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Abstract 
New evidence is presented on the possible existence of bi-directional causal relationships between 
public debt and economic growth in both central and peripheral countries of the European 
Economic and Monetary Union. We test for heterogeneity in the bi-directional Granger-causality 
across both time and space during the period between 1980 and 2013. The results suggest evidence 
of a “diabolic loop” between low economic growth and high public debt levels in Spain after 2009. 
For Belgium, Greece, Italy and the Netherlands debt has a negative effect over growth from an 
endogenously determined breakpoint and above a debt threshold ranging from 56% to 103% 
depending on the country. 
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1. Introduction 
Shambaugh (2012) pointed out that the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) 
countries have faced three interlocking crises (banking, sovereign debt, and economic 
growth) which together challenged the viability of the currency union. According to this 
line of thought, these crises connected with one another in several ways: the problems of 
weak banks and high sovereign debt were mutually reinforcing, and both were exacerbated 
by weak, constrained growth.  
Whilst Gómez-Puig, Sosvilla-Rivero and Singh (2015) focused on the interconnection 
between banking and sovereign debt crises in EMU countries, in this paper we will pay 
attention to the interrelationship between public debt and economic growth. The empirical 
literature on this topic not only presents ambiguous results, but is centred mainly on the 
possible impact of high debt levels on economic growth, disregarding the possibility of 
reverse causality running from growth to debt [Ferreira (2009) and Puente-Ajovín and 
Sanso-Navarro (2015) are some of the few exceptions]. However, there are some 
theoretical reasons for thinking that public debt is likely to accumulate when growth is low 
(see Bell et al., 2015). In this regard, since low growth means lower government revenue, 
governments may be forced to increase their debt levels to maintain the welfare state, to 
stimulate short-term demand and to raise long-term growth (Feldstein, 2014).  
Therefore, some kind of “diabolic loop” (see Brunnemeier et al., 2011)1 between high levels 
of debt and low levels of economic growth may have arisen with the outbreak of the 
financial crisis in most economies in 2008 (EMU countries among them). An increase in 
government debt levels both raises government deficits and changes investors’ 
expectations. On the one hand, the rise in the government deficit increases the need to 
borrow and pushes up interest rates; this, through a “crowding-out” effect on private 
investment, may undermine economic growth. On the other, the increase in investors’ risk 
                                                          
1 These authors described the development of a “diabolic loop” between sovereign and banking risk in euro area countries.  
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aversion may induce a “flight-to-safety” that may favour bonds of countries generally 
regarded to have a low default risk. In turn, as economic growth decreases, since 
government revenues also decline, governments are forced to increase their debt levels in 
order to maintain the welfare state (the economy’s “automatic stabilizers” may start to 
work, meaning an increase in public expenditure in social security transfers, for instance).  
The recent European debt crisis indicates open academic questions that policy makers 
might need answer to. Events of the last few years have led to increasing concern about the 
possibly adverse consequences of the substantial accumulation of public debt of EMU 
countries. The debate is currently so hotly contested, because pundits draw widely different 
conclusions for macroeconomic policy, and in particular pro and contra economic austerity 
policies. 
In this context, the main objective of this paper is to shed some additional light on this 
challenging avenue of research by applying the Granger-causality approach and 
endogenous breakpoint tests in order to analyse the evolution of bi-directional causality 
between sovereign debt and economic growth in 11 EMU countries (both central and 
peripheral) during a time period that spans from 1980 to 2013. Therefore, we will consider 
the potential heterogeneity in the bi-directional causality across both time and space 
(periods and countries). 
Although some authors have applied the Granger methodology to examine causality 
between these two variables for a group of countries member of the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) by means of panel techniques2, to our 
knowledge the bi-directional causal relationship between public debt and economic growth 
and its evolution over time has not been examined individually for each EMU country. In 
particular, in order to compare our results with those of the existing literature, our paper is 
                                                          
2 Panizza and Presbitero (2014) also investigate causation (not correlation) between sovereign debt levels and economic growth, adopting 
an instrumental variable approach that captures valuation effects caused by the interaction between foreign currency debt and exchange 
rate volatility.  
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closely related to those of Ferreira (2009) and Puente-Ajovín and Sanso-Navarro (2015) 3. 
However, in contrast to those studies, we do not make use of panel Granger-causality tests 
to combine the power of cross section averaging with all the subtleties of temporal 
dependence; rather, we explore the time series dimension of the issue.  Our methodology is 
data-driven and allows us to select the statistical model that best approximates the 
relationship between the variables under study for any particular country. We follow 
Ferreira (2009) regarding the need to pre-test for unit roots and cointegration (not required 
in the approach used by Puente-Ajovín and Sanso-Navarro, 2015), but we rely on direct 
estimation of individual relationships rather than on bootstrapping country-specific effects, 
as in Puente-Ajovín and Sanso-Navarro (2015). Moreover, our approach allows the 
possible Granger-causal relationships to change during the sample period (see Gómez-Puig 
and Sosvilla-Rivero, 2014) and to determine endogenously the breakpoints in the evolution 
of those relationships, thus permitting us to evaluate them before and after such 
breakpoints. 
In our opinion, the proposed analysis is particularly relevant in an environment in which 
deleveraging policies need to be implemented in some euro area countries, but their 
beneficial effects are still a matter for debate. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. 
Section 2 presents a short literature review. Section 3 explains the econometric 
methodology, and the data and empirical results are reported in Section 4. Finally, some 
concluding remarks and policy implications are provided in Section 5.   
2. Literature review 
The results from the empirical literature on the relationship between public debt and 
economic growth are far from being conclusive (see Panizza and Presbitero (2013) for a 
survey). While the first studies [see, for example, Modigliani (1961), Diamond (1965) and 
                                                          
3 Magazzino (2012) investigates the relationship between some individual items of expenditure and GDP for the Italian case using 
cointegration and Granger causality tests.  
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Saint-Paul (1992)] sustained that a public debt increase always contributed to economic 
growth, more recent work has presented totally different results. Patillo et al., (2004) 
conclude that whilst low levels of public debt affect economic growth positively, high levels 
have a negative impact; Schclarek (2005) does not find any significant relation between 
public debt and economic growth in industrial countries, whereas Kumar and Woo (2010), 
controlling for other factors that also influence growth, detected an inverse relationship 
between the two variables. This long run negative relationship is also found by Mitze and 
Matz (2015) who study the relationship between regional public debt intensities and 
economic output for German federal states between 1970 and 2010.  
In their seminal work, Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) studied economic growth for different 
thresholds of public debt using a database of 44 countries over a time period spanning 200 
years. Their results suggest that the relationship is weak for public debt ratios below 90% 
of GDP, but that, above this threshold, on average, growth rates decrease substantially.  
However, since the publication of their paper, the 90% threshold has not only been 
questioned but has also been the focus of much of the debate in the literature: see 
Cecchetti et al. (2011), Minea and Paren (2012), Presbitero (2012), Baum et al. (2012), 
Checherita-Westphal and Rother (2012), Herdon et al. (2013) and Égert (2013), to name a 
few.  
Moreover, the recent global recession and sovereign debt crisis in Europe have stimulated 
an intense debate both on the effectiveness of fiscal policies and on the consequences of 
public debt increases, in a situation in which leverage is already very high in European 
economies. In this regard,. Gómez-Puig (2013) attempts to quantify the total level of  
indebtedness (public and private) in all euro area countries, using a database created with 
the statistics provided by the European Central Bank. According to her calculations, total 
leverage (public and private) over GDP recorded levels of 710%, 487%, 413%, 360% and 
353%, in September 2012, in Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece respectively. 
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However, it is important to stress that the main causes of the imbalances and high leverage 
levels in the euro area vary according to the country (see Gómez-Puig and Sosvilla-Rivero, 
2013). In Ireland, the crisis was mainly due to the private sector, particularly a domestic 
housing boom which was financed by foreign borrowers who did not require a risk 
premium related to the probability of default. In Spain, since absorption exceeded 
production, the external debt grew and the real exchange rate appreciated, implying a loss 
of competitiveness for the economy. Unlike previous expansions, the resort to financing 
was not led by the public sector but by private households and firms. In contrast to Ireland 
and Spain, the origin of the debt crisis in Greece, Portugal and Italy was the structural 
deficit in the government sector. However, while Greek and Italian large fiscal deficit and 
huge public debt are the cumulative result of chronic macroeconomic imbalances, the case 
of Portugal illustrates the importance of external debt (specifically, that of its private sector: 
banks and enterprises).  
In this context of low economic growth and high leverage levels in EMU countries, there is 
no consensus among economists about which are the right solutions to implement. While 
some suggest that now is precisely the time to apply the lessons learnt during the Great 
Depression and that policymakers should implement expansionary fiscal policies [see, 
among others, Krugman (2011), Berg and Ostry (2011) or DeLong and Summers (2012)]4, 
others argue that, since the high level of public sector leverage has a negative effect on 
economic growth, fiscal consolidation is fundamental to restoring confidence and 
improving expectations about the future evolution of the economy (Cochrane, 2011). The 
latter approach, which supports austerity measures, has been highly influential among the 
EMU authorities and has the support of the empirical evidence presented in some 
influential papers (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2010, among them).  
                                                          
4 These authors state that deleveraging policies can even prove to be detrimental, depending on the fundamental variables of the 
economy. Their argument currently receives support from some politicians in Southern Europe.  
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Nevertheless, in our reading of the empirical evidence, no strong case has yet been made 
for a causal bi-directional relationship between public debt and economic growth in EMU 
countries, taking into account not only cross-country heterogeneity in the euro area, but 
also its time-varying nature. This paper aims to fill this gap in the literature.  
3. Econometric methodology 
3.1 Testing for causality 
The concept of Granger-causality was introduced by Granger (1969) and Sims (1972) and 
is widely used to ascertain the importance of the interaction between two series. The 
central notion is one of predictability (Hoover, 2001): one variable Granger-causes some 
other variable, given an information set, if past information about the former can improve 
the forecast of the latter based only on its own past information. Therefore, knowledge of 
the evolution of one series reduces the forecast errors of the other, suggesting that the 
latter does not evolve independently of the former.  
Testing Granger causality typically uses the same lags for all variables. This poses a 
potential problem, since Granger-causality tests are sensitive to lag length. Therefore, it is 
important that the lengths selected should be the right ones so as to avoid inconsistently 
estimating the model and drawing misleading inferences (see Thornton and Batten, 1985). 
In determining the optimal lag structure for each variable, we follow Hsiao’s (1981) 
sequential method to test for causality, which combines Akaike (1974)’s final predictive 
error (FPE, from now on) and the definition of Granger-causality5. Essentially, the FPE 
criterion trades off the bias that arises from under-parameterization of a model against a 
loss in efficiency resulting from its over-parameterization, thus avoiding the ambiguities of 
the conventional procedure. Consider the following models:  
 t 0
1
m
i t i t
i
X X  

                     (1) 
                                                          
5 Thornton and Batten (1985) show that Akaike (1974)’s FPE criterion performs well relative to other statistical techniques. 
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t i t i j t j t
i j
X X Y    
 
                                      (2)       
where Xt and Yt  are stationary variables [i.e., they are I(0) variables]. The following steps 
are used to apply Hsiao’s procedure for testing Granger-causality: 
i) Treat Xt as a one-dimensional autoregressive process (1), and compute its FPE with 
the order of lags m varying from 1 to m6. Choose the order which yields the smallest 
FPE, say m, and denote the corresponding FPE as FPEX (m, 0). 
ii) Treat Xt as a controlled variable with m number of lags, and treat Yt as a 
manipulated variable as in (2). Compute again the FPE of (2) by varying the order 
of lags of Yt from 1 to n, and determine the order which gives the smallest FPE, say 
n, and denote the corresponding FPE as FPEX (m,n)
7. 
iii) Compare FPEX (m, 0) with FPEX (m,n) [i.e., compare the smallest FPE in step (i) 
with the smallest FPE in step (ii)]. If FPEX (m,0) > FPEX (m,n), then Yt is said to 
cause Xt. If FPEX (m,0) < FPEX (m,n), then Xt is an independent process. 
iv) Repeat steps i) to iii) for the Yt variable, treating Xt as the manipulated variable. 
When Xt and Yt are not stationary variables but are first-difference stationary [i.e., they are 
I(1) variables] and cointegrated (see Dolado et al., 1990), it is possible to investigate the 
existence of a Granger-causal relationships from ∆Xt to ∆Yt and from ∆Yt to ∆Xt, using 
the following error correction models: 
0
1
m
t i t i t
i
X X  

                                      (3) 
        0 1
1 1
m n
t t i t i j t j t
i j
X Z X Y      
 
                  (4) 
                                                          
6
 FPEX(m,0)  is computed using the formula: 1( ,0) · ,
1
X
T m SSR
FPE m
T m T
 

 
where T is the total number of observations and SSR is the 
sum of squared residuals of OLS regression (1) 
7 FPEX(m,n)  is computed using the formula: 1( , ) · ,
1
X
T m n SSR
FPE m n
T m n T
  

  
where T is the total number of observations and SSR is 
the sum of squared residuals of OLS regression (2) 
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where Zt is the ordinary least square (OLS) residual of the cointegrating regression 
(
t tX Y   ), known as the error-correction term. Note that, if Xt and Yt are I (1) 
variables, but they are not cointegrated, then β in (4) is assumed to be equal to zero. 
In both cases [i.e., Xt  and Yt  are I(1) variables, and they are or are not cointegrated], we can 
use Hsiao’s sequential procedure substituting Xt with ∆Xt and Yt with ∆Yt in steps i) to iv), 
as well as substituting expressions (1) and (2) with equations (3) and (4). Proceeding in this 
way, we ensure efficiency since the system is congruent and encompassing (Hendry and 
Mizon, 1999). 
3.2 Stability Diagnostics 
In conventional Granger-causality analysis, the relationship between two variables is 
assumed to exist at all times. However, in a time period that spans more than 30 years, 
parameter non-constancy may occur (with the advent of either a financial or economic 
crisis, or due to some other kind of shock) and may generate misleading inferences if left 
undetected (see Bai and Perron, 1998, 2003; Perron, 1989; Zivot and Andrews, 1992). 
Furthermore, the pre-testing issue in early studies may have induced a size distortion of the 
resulting test procedures (Bai, 1997). Thus, it is desirable to let the data select when and 
where regime shifts occur (i. e., we need to test for the null hypothesis of no structural 
change versus the alternative hypothesis that changes are present). To this end, we first 
identify a single structural change using the Quandt–Andrews one-time unknown structural 
break test. We then use the procedure suggested by Bai (1997) and Bai and Perron (1998, 
2003) to detect multiple unknown breakpoints in order to obtain further evidence of the 
existence of the breakpoints previously detected endogenously (for a detailed description of 
these tests, see Gómez-Puig and Sosvilla-Rivero 2014).  
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4. Data and empirical results 
4.1. Data  
We use annual data for the variables government debt-to-Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
(denoted DEBT) and real economic growth (measured as the percentage change of GDP 
product at constant prices, denoted by GROWTH) from 1980 to 2013 collected from the 
International Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook Database for both EMU-11 
peripheral (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain) and central countries (Austria, 
Belgium, Finland, France, Germany and the Netherlands) 8. 
4.2. Preliminary results 
As a first step, we tested for the order of integration of the DEBT and GROWTH by 
means of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests. The results decisively reject the null 
hypothesis of non-stationarity for DEBT but not for GROWTH, suggesting that our 
indicator of public debt can be treated as first-difference stationary and real growth as 
stationary9. Then, following Cheung and Chinn’s (1997) suggestion, we confirm these 
results using the Kwiatkowski et al. (1992) (KPSS) tests, where the null is a stationary 
process against the alternative of a unit root10.  
Therefore, our preliminary results indicate that, on the one hand, the relevant model for 
testing for Granger-causality from (percentage change in) government debt to growth is the 
following one:  
                                                          
8This distinction between central and peripheral countries has been extensively used in the empirical literature. The two groups we 
consider roughly correspond to the distinction made by the European Commission (1995) between those countries whose currencies 
continuously participated in the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) from its inception maintaining broadly stable bilateral 
exchange rates among themselves over the sample period, and those countries whose currencies either entered the ERM later or 
suspended its participation in the ERM, as well as fluctuating in value to a great extent relative to the Deutschmark. These two groups 
are also roughly the same found in Jacquemin and Sapir (1996), applying multivariate analysis techniques to a wide set of structural and 
macroeconomic indicators, to form a homogeneous group of countries. Moreover, these two groups are basically the same that those 
found in Ledesma-Rodríguez et al. (2005) according to the perception of economic agents with respect to the commitment to maintain 
the exchange rate around a central parity in the ERM and those identifying by Sosvilla-Rivero and Morales-Zumaquero (2012) using 
cluster analysis when analysing permanent and transitory volatilities of EMU sovereign yields.  
9 These results (that are not shown here in order to save space, but they are available from the authors upon request) were confirmed 
using Phillips-Perron (1998) unit root tests controlling for serial correlation and the Elliott, Rothenberg, and Stock (1996) Point Optimal 
and Ng and Perron (2001) unit root tests for testing non-stationarity against the alternative of high persistence. These additional results 
are also available from the authors. 
10 The results are not shown here due to space restrictions but are available from the authors upon request. 
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GROWTH GROWH  

                (5) 
        
0
1 1
m n
t i t i j t j t
i j
GROWTH GROWTH DEBT    
 
                 (6) 
where ∆ denotes first difference (i. e., 
1t t tDEBT DEBT DEBT    ). 
On the other hand, the relevant model for testing for Granger-causality from growth to 
(percentage change in) government debt is the following one11:  
0
1
m
t i t i t
i
DEBT DEBT  

                                   (7) 
        
0
1 1
m n
t i t i j t j t
i j
DEBT DEBT GROWTH    
 
                     (8) 
4.3. Empirical results for the whole sample 
The resulting FPE statistics for the whole sample (1980-2013) are reported in Tables 1a 
and 1b.12 
 [Insert Tables 1 here] 
Tables 1a and 1b show that in two cases (Finland and France) our results suggest 
bidirectional Granger-causality; whilst in five cases (Belgium, Germany, Greece, Ireland 
and Portugal) we find no evidence of Granger-causality relationships in any of the 
directions. However, for the rest of the countries (Austria, Italy, the Netherlands and 
Spain) we find evidence of Granger-causality only running from the percentage change in 
sovereign debt to economic growth. The last column in Tables 1 reports the static long-run 
solution obtained from the estimated dynamic results, which can be taken as an indicator 
of the impact of one variable over the other (see Hendry, 1997, Chapter 7). As can be seen 
                                                          
11 Note that, since the variables are of different order of integration, they cannot be cointegrated and therefore there is not an error 
correction term in equations (5) to (8). Although the Granger representation theorem (Engle and Granger, 1987) states that if two time-
series are cointegrated, then there must be Granger causality between them (either one-way or in both directions), the converse is not 
true and we can still find causality between these variables. 
12 These results were confirmed using both Wald statistics to test the joint hypothesis 
1 2
ˆ ˆ ˆ... 0n       in equations (6) and (8) 
and the Williams-Kloot test for forecasting accuracy (Williams, 1959). These additional results are not shown here in order to save space, 
but they are available from the authors upon request.  
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in Table 1a, it ranges from 0.1079 to 1.2152, suggesting a positive (and in four of the six 
cases very high) effect of variations in public debt on real growth; whilst Table 1b displays 
values within the interval (0.7107, 0.8617), also indicating a positive and high impact of 
economic growth on changes in public debt-to-GDP ratios.  
Summing up, when analysing the whole sample period, we find more evidence of causality 
running from changes in government debt to growth (we find evidence of causality in 
seven out of the eleven cases studied) rather than from growth to modifications in public 
debt (for which there is empirical evidence only in the cases of Finland and France). 
However, it is important to stress that in the cases where we find evidence of Granger-
causality between these two variables, the effect is not negative but positive. This finding 
suggests that in some countries, in line with the first studies by Modigliani (1961), Diamond 
(1965) or Saint-Paul (1992) which contended that a public debt increase always contributed 
to economic growth, there is evidence of a positive effect of changes in government debt 
on growth, and vice-versa.  
4.4. Empirical results allowing for structural breaks 
In order to gain further insight into the dynamic Granger-causality between the percentage 
change in the debt-to-GDP ratio and growth, we now examine the existence of breakpoints 
in causality evolution in order to analyse bi-directional Granger-causality before and after 
the detected break dates. To do so, we do not set a specific breakpoint based on a priori 
knowledge about the potential break date; we first apply the Quandt-Andrews breakpoint 
test and let the data select when regime shifts occur in each potential causal relationship, 
and later we confirm the breakpoint identified by using the tests developed by Bai and 
Perron (1998, 2003) for detecting multiple structural breaks13.  
The results of our tests for detecting breakpoints are presented in Tables 2a and 2b14.  
                                                          
13 We compute the breakpoint tests using a statistic which is robust to heteroskedasticity, since we estimate our original equations with 
Newey and West (1987) standard errors. 
14 In order to save space, the numerical results of Quandt-Andrews and Bai-Perron tests are not reported in Tables 2a and 2b, but are 
available from the authors upon request. 
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[Insert Tables 2 here] 
In particular, these tables show that in 16 out of the 22 relationships between percentage 
changes in public debt and growth (73% of the total cases), the break date takes place after 
2007 (coinciding with the beginning of the global financial crisis) and in more than a third 
of the cases (36%) it takes place in 2009 (matching the outbreak of the European debt 
crisis). The exceptions are Finland, with a break date for the causal relationship that runs 
from growth to alterations in sovereign debt in 1995 (which might be explained by the fact 
that Finland joined the European Union on 1 January 199515); Germany, with a break date 
for the causal relationship from variations in public debt to growth in 1992, and one for the 
relationship from growth to changes in the public debt-to-GDP ratio in 1990 (just after 
German reunification in 1990, which led to a boom in demand and higher inflation which 
the Bundesbank countered with restrictive policy measures)16; Greece with a break point in 
the relationship that runs from differences in government debt to economic growth in 
1995 (a year identified as a turning point for the Greek economy after the Bank of Greece’s 
adoption of the “hard drachma policy”- see, for example, Bryant et al., 2001 or Trachanas 
and Katrakilidis, 201317); and Ireland, with a break date for the causal relationship that runs 
from growth to modifications in sovereign debt in 1988 (when the government debt-to-
GDP ratio reached its peak, with levels close to 110%, before the financial crisis, in a 
complex economic environment with unemployment and interest rates running into double 
figures and emigration increasing).  
Regarding the Granger-causality before and after the endogenous detected breakpoint, 
Table 2a shows that only in two countries (Ireland and Portugal) there was no evidence of 
Granger-causality between changes in public debt and growth at any point in the period, 
                                                          
15 The accession of Finland to the European Union took place in a difficult economic environment after the early 1990s recession, but 
reinforced its tradition of fiscal responsibility. See Honkapohja and Koskela (1999) and OECD (2010). 
16 On 18 May 1990, the two German states (the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany) signed a treaty 
agreeing on monetary, economic and social union. Reunification was accompanied by a massive domestic fiscal expansion as the Bonn 
government borrowed in order to rebuild East Germany and transfer income to its relatively poor citizens who, for their part, began to 
consume more and demanded higher wages.  
17 The aim of this policy, which meant that the exchange rate was used as a nominal anchor, was to improve the convergence of the 
Greek economy toward the remainder of the EU. We should recall that in 1995, the ratio of government debt-to-GDP reached levels 
close to 100% in Greece (see Figure 1b), far higher than those required by the Maastricht Treaty (60%, a figure that was never fulfilled). 
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whilst in the case of Germany, we find evidence of a positive causal relationship between 
variations in the debt-to-GDP ratio and growth only after the break point (1992). 
Nevertheless, in the eight remaining countries causality between alterations in sovereign 
debt and economic growth decreases after the break point. In three countries (Austria, 
Finland and France), the causal relationship declines but remains positive after the break 
date; while in the case of Belgium, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain the causal 
relationship between variations in public debt and growth is positive before the break but 
becomes negative after that date.  
With respect to the causal relationship running from growth to the percentage change in 
the public debt-to-GDP ratio (Table 2b), we found no evidence for it in any of the periods 
studied for four out of the eleven countries: Austria, Greece, Italy and Portugal. In the 
remaining seven cases the evidence is mixed. While in three cases (Finland, Ireland and 
Spain) the causal relationship decreases after the break – indeed, in Finland and Spain the 
relationship between growth and variations in government debt is negative after the break 
date, suggesting that low economic growth might lead to an increase in the level of 
government debt – in the other four cases (Belgium, France, Germany and the 
Netherlands) the causal relationship between growth and the percentage change in the 
public debt-to-GDP ratio registers a positive increase after the break date detected in each 
individual country.   
Tables 2a and 2b also report the estimated static long-run solution obtained from the 
dynamic results (see Hendry, 1995). As can be seen in Table 2a, the static long-run 
parameters assessing the impact of variations of public debt on growth register a significant 
reduction before and after the crisis, becoming negative in four of the seven cases where 
we had found Granger-causality in both subperiods (ranging from -0.1063 to -0.7222). For 
Belgium and Germany, where we only detect causality after the crisis, we find a positive 
static long-run solution for Germany and a negative one for Belgium. Regarding Table 2b, 
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for the cases of Finland and France, where we find evidence of Granger-causality before 
and after the crisis, while in the former case there is a sensitive reduction in the static long-
run solution for the impact of growth on variations of public debt (becoming negative), in 
the latter case there is a forcible increase in the positive effect. Finally, for the cases where 
Granger-causality is only detected after the crisis, we obtain positive static long-run 
parameters for Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands (ranging from 0.7742 to 6.3966) 
and a high negative value for Spain (-12.3380). 
Since the evidence seems much more conclusive in the relationships that run from changes 
in public debt to economic growth, we have plotted the evolution of the two variables, 
jointly with the break date in the relationship for both central and peripheral countries. 
[Insert Figures 1here]  
If we focus our analysis on central countries (Figure 1a), we observe that in Belgium, 
variations in public debt began to Granger-cause negatively economic growth from 2009 
onwards when the debt-to-GDP ratio was around 96.5%. In the Netherlands, changes in 
government debt began to have a negative effect on growth also from 2009 onwards, when 
the debt-to-GDP reached a level of 56%.  
In the case of peripheral countries (Figure 1b), in Greece, shifts in sovereign debt have a 
negative effect on growth after 1995 when the debt-to-GDP level was close to 97%. In 
Italy, we find evidence that changes in public debt Granger-cause economic growth after 
2007 when the debt-to-GDP presented a value of 103%. Finally, in Spain, variations in 
government debt begin to have a negative effect on real growth after 2009 with a debt-to-
GDP ratio of 53%.  
This evidence suggests that there is a negative relationship between changes in public debt 
and economic growth in five of the eleven countries studied after the detected break date, 
and that the debt threshold above which the relationship becomes negative differs 
according to the country (see Table 2a). According to our evidence, this threshold ranges 
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from 53% in the case of Spain to 103% in the case of Italy. These results are highly 
significant, since they not only reinforce the idea that causality should be examined from a 
dynamic point of view, but also that a specific analysis for each country is necessary, since 
the debt threshold above which an increase in the level of indebtedness might undermine 
economic performance varies according to the economic situation of each country. 
Moreover, three of the five cases in which we found that, after an endogenously 
determined break date, variations in public debt had a negative effect on growth 
corresponded to peripheral countries: Spain (from 2009 and a debt-threshold of 53%), 
Greece (from 1995 and a debt-threshold of 97%) and Italy (from 2009 and a debt-
threshold of 103%). Therefore, these results may have important implications for 
policymakers, in a context, in which they must manage the trade-off between policies that 
might enhance growth and those that favour a deleveraging of the economy18.  
Finally, it is also noticeable that growth negatively Granger-causes percentage changes in 
public debt, after an endogenously determined break date, in the case of Finland and Spain 
(see Table 2b). In particular, in the case of Spain, we might conclude that our empirical 
evidence suggests the existence of a “diabolical loop” between low economic growth (the 
threshold rate seems to be 0.9%) and high public debt levels after 2009, indicating that 
insuring against the risks of stagnation would require addressing both longer-term 
structural issues and crisis legacies. 
 
5. Concluding remarks and policy implications. 
Although the empirical literature has studied the effects of high levels of debt on economic 
growth, to our knowledge, no strong case has yet been made for a causal bi-directional 
relationship between (changes in) public debt and economic growth in EMU countries, 
                                                          
18 Nevertheless, Aguiar et al. (2015) demonstrate that a high-debt country may be less vulnerable to crises and have higher welfare when it 
belongs to a union with an intermediate mix of high- and low-debt members, than one where all other members are low-debt. This 
contrasts with the conventional wisdom that all countries should prefer a union with low-debt members, as such a union can credibly 
deliver low inflation. 
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taking into account not only cross-country heterogeneity in the euro area, but also its time-
varying nature. The aim of this paper was to fill this gap in the literature. In order to 
consider the potential heterogeneity in the bi-directional causality across both time and 
space (periods and countries), we applied the Granger-causality approach and endogenous 
breakpoint tests between public debt and economic growth during the 1980-2013 period. 
This approach allows a deeper understanding of how the relationships between these 
variables might be exacerbated or mitigated during the sample. 
The results for the whole sample between 1980 and 2013 are not at odds with those 
presented by other authors, but they do qualify them. As in our study, Panniza and 
Presbitero (2014) and Puente-Ajovín and Sanso-Navarro (2015) do not find negative 
causation (the latter examined Granger-causality) between sovereign debt and economic 
growth for a sample period that finishes in 2009. However, when we analyse Granger-
causality after endogenously detecting a breakpoint (which, in most cases, takes place 
between 2007 and 2009), we find evidence of negative Granger-causality between changes 
in sovereign debt and growth in some of the countries studied between the break date and 
the end of the sample period in 2013.   
As in every empirical analysis, the results must be taken with caution since they are based 
on a set of countries over a certain period and on a given econometric methodology. 
However, our findings suggest that there is evidence of a “diabolic loop” between low 
economic growth and high public debt levels in Spain since 2009. Moreover, in the case of 
Belgium, Greece, Italy and the Netherlands, variations in public debt have a negative effect 
over growth after an endogenously determined breakpoint and above a debt threshold that 
ranges from 56% to 103%, depending on the country19. In addition, our findings suggest 
                                                          
19 Although we use a completely different methodology, our results are in concordance with those presented by the authors who found 
that above a certain debt-to-GDP threshold an increase in public indebtedness had a negative effect on economic growth [see Reinhart 
and Rogoff (2010), Cecchetti et al. (2011), Minea and Paren (2012), Presbitero (2012), Baum et al. (2012), Checherita-Westphal and 
Rother (2012), and Égert (2013), to name a few]  
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that considered EMU countries not only face different initial conditions, but they also have 
heterogeneous relations both between public debt and economic growth and between 
economic growth and public debt. 
Taken together, our findings argue in favour of confronting the excessive fiscal imbalances 
in three southern EMU countries that have been hit by the recent sovereign debt crisis: 
Italy, Greece, and Spain, although they still register low rates of economic growth. The 
empirical evidence suggests that an increase in the level of public indebtedness, which 
might be accompanied by a relaxation of austerity programs, may not boost economic 
growth, but increase its decline. Nevertheless, even though we do agree that it is imperative 
to lower public debt over time, we also think that European policymakers need to be aware 
of the negative short-run effects of fiscal adjustments (see Cotarelli and Jaramillo, 2012) on 
growth prospects.  
Therefore, we think that a right measured pace of adjustment might be preferable. Even 
though, this pace should differ among countries since the debt threshold above which an 
increase in public debt might decrease economic growth is not the same among euro area 
countries. In this sense, whilst the threshold is around public debt-to-GDP ratios close to 
50% in Spain and the Netherlands, it clearly surpasses the 90% level in the cases of 
Belgium, Greece and Italy. So, in the latter countries, in particular in the Greek and Italian 
cases (whose economies have been severely hit by the crisis), our findings suggest that the 
pace of fiscal adjustment might be lower than in the former ones. Besides, in order to 
support growth when fiscal policy is tightened, we also support the need for reforms in 
goods, service, and labor markets that might improve economic efficiency and boost 
potential growth, serving as important tools in the fiscal adjustment process. Policies 
enhancing both stability and growth are possible in EMU and some of them have started 
being implemented while others are at an advanced stage of development. 
19 
 
However, given the importance of these policy implications, we believe that further 
research is required to better understand and quantify the different effect of public debt on 
economic growth in the short and in the long run, and to guide the structural and 
institutional reforms needed to minimize painful economic effects for some European 
countries (see Anderson, Hunt and Snudden, 2014) in order to move towards the 
establishment of a "more perfect union"(Aizenman 2015). 
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Table 1a. FPE statistics, all sample (∆Debt → Growth) 
 FPE(m.0) FPE(m.n)  Causality Impact 
∆ATDEBT → ATGROWTH 3.6192 (1.0) 3.4518 (1.2) Yes 1.2152 
∆BEDEBT → BEGROWTH 3.4085 (2.0) 3.4521 (2.1) No  
∆FIDEBT → FIGROWTH 10.5553 (1.0) 9.1998 (1.1) Yes 0.1079 
∆FRDEBT → FRGROWT 2.6149 (1.0) 2.2787 (1.2) Yes 0.7259 
∆GEDEBT → GEGROWTH 5.5113 (1.0) 5.6604 (1.1) No  
∆GRDEBT → GRGROWTH 5.8721 (1.0) 6.2241 (1.1) No  
∆IEDEBT → IEGROWTH 9.3414 (1.0) 9.7624 (1.1) No  
∆ITDEBT → ITGROWTH 3.8557 (1.0) 3.3013 (1.1) Yes 0.4256 
∆NLDEBT → NLGROWTH 3.4411 (1.0) 2.8179 (1.2) Yes 0.7021 
∆PTDEBT → PTGROWTH 4.9873 (1.0) 5.3018 (1.1) No  
∆SPDEBT → SPGROWTH 3.0333 (1.0) 3.0098 (1.1) Yes 0.7866 
 
Table 1b. FPE statistics, all sample (Growth → ∆Debt) 
 FPE(m.0) FPE(m.n)  Causality Impact 
  ATGROWTH → ∆ATDEBT 8.9099 (1.0) 9.5225 (1.1) No  
  BEGROWTH → ∆BEDEBT 10.7905(1.0) 11.3556 (1.1) No  
FIGROWTH → ∆FIDEBT 14.2982 (2.0) 13.9998 (2.1) Yes 0.7107 
  FRGROWTH → ∆FRDEBT 7.2823 (1.0) 7.0749 (1.1) Yes 0.8617 
  GEGROWTH → ∆GEDEBT 4.0397 (1.0) 4.9406 (1.1) No  
  GRGROWTH → ∆GRDEBT 8.7370 (1.0) 9.2978 (1.1) No  
  IEGROWTH → ∆IEDEBT 4.3576 (1.1) 4.6364 (1.1) No  
  ITGROWTH → ∆ITDEBT 3.7730 (1.0) 4.2267 (1.1) No  
  NLGROWTH → ∆NLDEBT 4.9931 (1.0) 5.9658 (1.1) No  
  PTGROWTH → ∆PTDEBT 3.3260 (1.0) 3.7053 (1.1) No  
  SPGROWTH → ∆SPDEBT 6.8209 (1.0) 7.8151 (1.1) No  
Notes: The figures in brackets are the optimum order of lags in each pair of countries. Impact shows the static long-run 
solution. ∆ denotes first difference. AT, BE, FI, FR, GE, GR, IE, IT, NL, PT and SP stand for Austria, Belgium, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain respectively. Bold values indicate the presence of Granger-
causality. 
 
Table 2a Causality analysis by sub-periods (∆Debt → Growth) 
 Before the break After the break  Break date Debt threshold 
∆ATDEBT → ATGROWTH Yes (0.7086) Yes (0.3054) 2009  
∆BEDEBT → BEGROWTH No Yes (-0.3288) 2009 97% 
∆FIDEBT → FIGROWTH Yes (0.6651) Yes (0.3065) 2008  
∆FRDEBT → FRGROWTH Yes (0.9652) Yes (0.1273) 2009  
∆GEDEBT → GEGROWTH No Yes (0.3439) 1992  
∆GRDEBT → GRGROWTH Yes (0.1900) Yes (-0.7222) 1995 97% 
∆IEDEBT → IEGROWTH No No 2008  
∆ITDEBT → ITGROWTH Yes (0.5270) Yes (-0.1508) 2007 103% 
∆NLDEBT → NLGROWTH Yes (2.3476) Yes (-0.1063) 2009 56% 
∆PTDEBT → PTGROWTH No No 2008  
∆SPDEBT → SPGROWTH Yes (2.8895) Yes (-0.1074) 2009 53% 
 
 
Table 2b Causality analysis by sub-periods (Growth → ∆Debt) 
 Before the break After the break  Break date Growth threshold 
  ATGROWTH → ∆ATDEBT No No 2009  
  BEGROWTH → ∆BEDEBT No Yes (4.2152) 2008  
  FIGROWTH → ∆FIDEBT Yes (0.4863) Yes (-0.2060) 1995 4% 
  FRGROWTH → ∆FRDEBT Yes (0.4127) Yes (6.3966) 2007  
  GEGROWTH → ∆GEDEBT No Yes (0.7742) 1990  
  GRGROWTH → ∆GRDEBT No No 2009  
  IEGROWTH → ∆IEDEBT Yes (3.3019) No 1988  
  ITGROWTH → ∆ITDEBT No No 1995  
  NLGROWTH → ∆NLDEBT No Yes (1.4729) 2008  
  PTGROWTH → ∆PTDEBT No No 2009  
  SPGROWTH → ∆SPDEBT No Yes (-12.3380) 2008 0.9% 
Notes:  The figures in brackets are the estimated long-run solutions. ∆ denotes first difference.  AT, BE, FI, FR, GE, GR, 
IE, IT, NL, PT and SP stand for Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain 
respectively. Bold values indicate Granger-causality. Bold italic values indicate new Granger-causality not detected in the 
whole sample. Shaded cells indicate the detection of negative static long-run parameters after the crisis.
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Figure 1. Debt-to-GDP, Growth and breakpoint for the relationship running from ∆debt to growth: 1980-2013 
Figure 1a. EMU Central Countries Figure 1b. EMU Peripheral Countries 
    
    
   
Notes: Debt-to-GDP ratios (left scale) and real GDP growth 
